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I.
Introduction
In an effort to understand the human dynamics at work in a difficult and contentious
water negotiation, the Natural Resources Law Center of the University of Colorado Law
School convened two workshops of persons with extensive experience in such
negotiations. One workshop consisted of stakeholders and attorneys who had
participated in one or both of two admirable (but ultimately unsuccessful) efforts to
resolve the water conflicts in the Klamath Basin by mediated negotiations. The other
workshop consisted of professional negotiators, mediators and attorneys who had taken
part in difficult water negotiations throughout the West. The goals of the two workshops
were the same: to understand why water conflicts are so difficult to resolve by
negotiation and to develop some practical guidelines for how to organize and conduct a
difficult water negotiation.2
Part II of this report presents ten guidelines for organizing and managing negotiations
that emerged out of the discussions at the two workshops. The guidelines do not
constitute a comprehensive manual on how to negotiate contentious water disputes.
Rather, they represent a set of ideas, suggestions and warnings from experienced
negotiators to those who are about to embark on a difficult but potentially rewarding task.
The gist of this report is contained in Parts III and IV. Part III describes what was truly a
remarkable event: a dialogue among the contending sides in the Klamath conflict about
why they had been unable to negotiate a resolution to their conflict. Part IV describes
how experienced negotiators, attorneys and mediators reacted to the description of the
negotiation efforts in the Klamath. Taken together, Parts III and IV of this report
illustrate how seemingly inconsequential decisions about the management of the
negotiation process can have a major impact on the success or failure of a negotiation.

________________________
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II.
Ten Practical Guidelines for Organizing and Managing
High Stakes Water Negotiations
1) Because of the psychological and practical dynamics at work, initiating a
negotiation of a contentious water dispute is difficult. A government agency is often in
a better position to initiate a negotiation than private parties, but a government agency
that undertakes the task of initiating a negotiation must do so in ways that maintain the
integrity of the negotiating process without compromising its ability to actively
participate in the negotiations.
Organizing a negotiation over a contentious issue is always a difficult process. Someone
has to take the first step by proposing that the parties negotiate. No one wants to take this
first step because to do so may be misread by one’s opponents as a sign of weakness.
Most water negotiations are multiparty negotiations. Organizing a multiparty negotiation
is an even more difficult process. Someone has to assume the burden of contacting each
of the parties to sound out their willingness to negotiate. That person often finds herself
emerged in a collateral negotiation about how to organize and manage the negotiations.
When (as is frequently the case) a government agency is involved in a water conflict, the
agency can often take proactive steps to organize a negotiation that non-governmental
parties would be unwilling to take. Governmental agencies can propose negotiations as
part of their public and regulatory functions without fear that by doing so they somehow
will appear “weak”. Government agencies can devote resources to organizing a
negotiation that non-governmental parties may find hard to justify.
Getting the parties to the negotiating table is only part of the problem of convening a
negotiation. The other part is making sure that the parties have faith in the fairness and
integrity of the negotiation process. What is required to develop such faith will vary with
the situation; but, generally speaking, before addressing the substance of the conflict, the
parties will need to plan and organize the process, develop written ground rules for
conducting meetings and decide whether to retain a mediator.3
When a government agency organizes a negotiation, it is important that it do so in ways
that do not inhibit the agency’s ability to fully participate in the negotiation. For
example, the Oregon Water Resources Department (the “OWRD”) attempted to convene
a multiparty negotiation of the water rights claims in the Klamath Basin by providing a
forum where water rights claimants could come together to negotiate. To alleviate
concerns about the neutrality of the forum, OWRD’s Director delegated her role as
adjudicator of the water rights claims to another official and assumed the role of
3

Two excellent references containing practical guidelines for organizing multiparty consensus based
processes are: National Policy Consensus Initiative, A Practical Guideline to Consensus, available at
http:/www.policyconsensus.org/pubs/trainingmanual/html, and Lawrence Susskind and Jeffery Cruikshank,
Breaking the Impasses (1987)
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facilitator and manager of the negotiating process. To ensure that the parties had
confidence in the integrity of the process, the OWRD did not actively participate in most
aspects of the negotiations. Participants in the Klamath Workshop concluded, in
hindsight, that the negotiation process suffered because of the OWRD’s passive role.
What the OWRD should have done was to assume the role of a principal negotiator,
actively advancing water management and other proposals. The integrity of the
negotiating process could have been protected by other means, such as hiring a neutral
facilitator.
2) In most circumstances, a multiparty negotiation of a contentious dispute should not
begin until a conflict assessment has been performed by a neutral third party.
A conflict assessment is an assessment of the opportunities for and obstacles to resolving
a conflict by negotiation. To ensure that the assessment is realistic and neither too
pessimistic nor too optimistic, the assessment is performed by a neutral third party, such
as a mediator or other conflict management consultant. The purpose of the assessment is
twofold: to determine (i) whether it is likely to be productive to engage in negotiations
given the present state of the conflict and (ii), if an opportunity does exist, to develop
some ideas for how to proceed in ways that maximize the opportunities for success. As
part of the assessment, the consultant will conduct confidential interviews and based on
those interviews make recommendations about how to organize the negotiations. For
example, the consultant may make recommendations about the negotiating agenda,
identify other parties who ought to participate in the negotiations, suggest ways for
dealing with concerns about the fairness of the negotiating process and recommend
methods for dealing with disputed technical and scientific issues.
Conducting an assessment is critical when deciding whether to proceed with complex,
multiparty negotiation because, among other reasons, it reduces the likelihood that the
negotiations will fail on account of some easily remedied problem with the negotiation
process itself. For example, a conflict assessment was not performed in connection with
the OWRD’s effort to organize a negotiation of water rights claims in the Klamath.
Participants in the Negotiators Workshop believed that many of the problems that arose
in the Klamath negotiations could have been avoided had a conflict assessment been
performed as part of the OWRD’s efforts to initiate negotiations.
3) If one of the parties to the negotiation is a Native American Tribe, the negotiations
must be structured so as to respect and take account of the Tribe’s sovereign status.
Native American Tribes are not simply another party to a water negotiation. They are
sovereign nations that have unique interests and concerns that must be understood and
respected if the negotiations are to proceed in a productive manner. As sovereigns, tribes
are responsible for the future needs of their peoples and exercise regulatory authority
over tribal resources. Non-tribal negotiators are likely to make more progress if they

5

consider and respect the unique responsibilities that tribes have towards their peoples
when formulating negotiating proposals.
Many tribes regard negotiations and similar consensus based processes with suspicion.
They remember past broken promises and are concerned that their voice will be diluted if
they are just one of many negotiators in a multiparty negotiation. For these and other
reasons, tribes prefer to negotiate on a “government to government” basis with state and
federal officials. For this reason, tribal representatives at the Negotiators Workshop cited
Montana’s Compact Commission approach (where the State negotiates directly with the
tribes) as the preferred approach for negotiating tribal water rights claims.
Tribal representatives at the Negotiators Workshop warned other workshop participants
about the hazards of assuming that all tribes will approach negotiations in similar ways.
Each tribe is different, the representatives observed. Tribes have different customs,
traditions and levels of comfort with the negotiation process. An empathic response to a
Tribe’s unique culture and concerns is the most appropriate approach to negotiating with
a tribe.
4) A realistic but firm deadline is an essential component of a successful negotiation.
All negotiators must make difficult choices as negotiations proceed. Human nature is
such that negotiators are likely to avoid making difficult choices until being forced to do
so. An upcoming court hearing, regulatory action or other negotiating deadline forces
parties to make difficult choices they would otherwise be unwilling to make in the
absence of a deadline. One reason cited at the Klamath Workshop for the lack of
progress in negotiating water rights claims was the lack of negotiating deadlines.
Where negotiations are attempted and no court or other externally imposed negotiating
deadline is looming, the parties should construct some alternative mechanism for pushing
negotiations forward. For example, they might commit in advance to periodically
assessing the progress of negotiations and agree to terminate negotiations if sufficient
progress is not being made. One reason to hire a mediator is to ensure that someone
(namely the mediator) can hold the parties accountable for their lack of negotiating
progress.
When setting a negotiating deadline it is important that the deadline provide sufficient
time for the parties to deliberate. Also, if unexpected obstacles arise, the deadline should
be adjusted so as to allow the parties to respond to those obstacles without unduly
eliminating the pressure to reach an agreement.
5) The conveners of a negotiation confront a dilemma when deciding who to invite to
the negotiating table. Should only the “key players” be invited or should an invitation
be extended to all persons (or their representatives) who are impacted by the conflict?
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A negotiated agreement, no matter how beneficial, will not resolve a conflict unless all
persons who are impacted by the conflict accept the agreement. In a water negotiation,
the number of potentially impacted persons can be numerous. When this is true, the
convenors of the negotiation confront a difficult choice. Should they invite all impacted
parties to participate in the negotiations? If so, they must confront the difficult task of
managing what is likely to be a cumbersome negotiation. Alternatively, should they
invite only the “major players”? If so, they must confront the risk that uninvited
stakeholders will undermine the negotiations or the implementation of any agreements
reached.
Participants in the Negotiators Workshop differed over the question of whether persons
who are not parties to pending litigation should be invited to participate in a negotiation.
Some participants believed that inviting non-litigants would unduly complicate the
negotiations. Other participants believed that the failure to invite someone who, though
not a litigant, is impacted by the conflict could ultimately undermine the negotiations.
One participant made a practical suggestion for resolving this dilemma that many
workshop participants seconded. If the problem underlying the litigation can be resolved
by the court’s decision, only the parties to the litigation need participate in the
negotiation. However, if the problem will remain regardless of the outcome of the
litigation, a consensus based approach where all impacted persons are invited is
preferable.
Those who have little experience with multiparty negotiations tend to overestimate the
problems that arise when managing a large negotiating group. They sometimes attempt
to avoid these problems by unduly limiting the size of the negotiating group. Events in
the Klamath demonstrate the perils of not inviting all impacted parties to a negotiation. A
major issue in the Klamath is the amount of water necessary to protect endangered fish.
At a critical stage in the negotiations of the Klamath Tribes water rights claims, the Fish
& Wildlife Service took unilateral action that set the negotiations back. Environmental
stakeholders who attended the Klamath Workshop suggested that this problem might
have been avoided had environmental interests not been excluded from the negotiations.
6) Fragmented federal and state authority over water issues is a major impediment to
successful negotiations and creative ways must be found to address the negotiating
barriers created by “jurisdictional fragmentation”.
Many legal and regulatory issues can arise in a water conflict, and regulatory authority
over those issues is likely to be disbursed among competing federal and state authorities.
For example, in the Klamath, the US Bureau of Reclamation has regulatory authority
over the Klamath Reclamation Project, the US Fish & Wildlife Service has authority over
certain endangered species issues, the National Marine Fisheries Service has authority
over other endangered species issues, the Bureau of Indian Affairs has responsibilities for
water rights concerns of several Native American Tribes, and the Forest Service and
National Park Service have management responsibilities for lands impacted by the
Klamath water conflict. To further exacerbate the problem, the water allocation problems
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in the Klamath are interstate problems, necessitating the involvement of multiple Oregon
and California agencies.
Jurisdictional fragmentation is a major impediment to negotiations because the federal
government (and to a lesser extent, state government) is rarely able to “speak with one
voice”. Each agency that participates in a negotiation seeks to promote its own
regulatory agenda, an agenda that frequently conflicts with the agendas of other federal
agencies. As a consequence, negotiators find that, rather than being presented with a
unified federal negotiating position, they confront differing and often conflicting
negotiating demands. To deal with this problem, the federal government sometimes (as
in the case of Indian water rights negotiations) forms a negotiating team. Unfortunately,
the formation of such teams does not solve the problem unless a senior administration
official, directly or through a representative “with clout”, heads up the team.
7) If the negotiations involve contentious technical and scientific issues, a joint fact
finding process should be established for investigating these issues.
A major impediment to a negotiated resolution of any contentious dispute involving
technical and scientific issues is “advocacy science”. Each of the contending sides hires
an expert and the experts engage in a debate over which side’s science is “correct”. Since
the goal of the parties’ experts is to support their clients’ positions, advocacy science
creates much heat and sheds little light on complex issues that need to be satisfactorily
addressed before the conflict can be resolved.
In many negotiations involving water issues, the science is uncertain and no amount of
debate will eliminate that uncertainty. Moreover, many debates over science are in fact
debates over differing values. Pretending that uncertainty does not exist or that there are
scientific answers to questions that are in reality questions of values does nothing to
further resolution of difficult issues.
A preferred approach for dealing with scientific and technical issues relevant to the
outcome of a negotiation is a joint fact finding process. While the structure of the joint
fact finding process must be tailored to fit the circumstances, the essences of the process
is an investigation performed by a neutral expert (or panel of experts) under the direction
and control of all the negotiators. Sometimes the neutral expert is not asked “to find” the
correct answer. Rather, the expert is asked to identify areas where scientific opinion is
certain and areas where it is not. Sometimes the expert is asked to identify alternative
methods for addressing the problems underlying the conflict. When asked to do so, the
expert should also be asked to assess the risks and tradeoffs associated with each
alternative method.
As part of the joint fact finding process, the parties participate in an interactive dialogue
with the neutral expert so as to enhance their understanding of the complexities involved
in addressing problems to which there are no clear answers. As a consequence of the
dialogue, the parties often find themselves revising their original assumptions and
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preconceived notions about what must be done to resolve the problem. They then find
they are able to favorably consider negotiating proposals they would never have
entertained had there been no joint fact finding process.
8) In most circumstances, the negotiation of a multiparty dispute should not be
attempted without the assistance of a neutral mediator, unaffiliated with any of the
parties.
Negotiators are sometimes reluctant to retain a mediator, either out of fear of “giving up
control” over the negotiation process or out of a desire to avoid additional costs. Oregon
did not use a mediator in its Klamath water rights negotiations. Participants at the
Klamath Workshop cited the absence of a mediator as one of the factors contributing to
the failure of Oregon’s water rights negotiations.
The value that a mediator or skilled facilitator adds to the negotiation process is much
greater than most people realize. A mediator can manage the complexities inherent in
convening a negotiation, complexities that multiply with the number of stakeholders
involved. A mediator can insist that the parties set realistic negotiating deadlines and
stick to those deadlines. She can keep the negotiations on track despite the inevitable
disruptions caused by aggressive negotiating tactics. A mediator can help the parties
think of creative solutions to negotiating problems, solutions that go beyond compromise
and “create new value.” She can act as “an agent of reality” by reminding the parties of
the need to realistically assess the problems inherent in implementing negotiating
proposals.
9) Adequate funding to pay the often significant process costs associated with a
multiparty negotiation is an essential component of a successful negotiation.
The process costs associated with a multiparty negotiation of a contentious matter can be
substantial. In addition to the costs of a mediator, logistical costs (e.g. clerical support,
duplicating and mailing) will not be trivial. Where scientific and technical issues are in
dispute, it may be necessary to retain one or more neutral experts. Participants at the
Klamath Workshop cited the lack of money for process support as an important factor
contributing to the failure of the OWRD’s efforts to facilitate water rights negotiations. .
10) Negotiations will fail unless each negotiator, in addition to advancing his own
interests, also looks for opportunities to advance the interests of his opponents.
To state the obvious, people negotiate to achieve objectives they may be unable to
achieve by other means. Once a person concludes that she cannot achieve her objectives
through negotiation, she will abandon the negotiation and pursue her objectives through
other alternatives. Successful negotiators pay attention too and respond to the interest

9

and concerns of their opponents. They look for opportunities to further their opponents’
interests to the extent that they can do so without undermining their own interests.
In the Klamath, a federal court ordered that irrigators whose water deliveries had been
curtailed participate in court supervised mediation with environmental and other groups
concerned about the aquatic ecosystem. Irrigators sought to negotiate over such things
as the resumption of irrigation deliveries; the other groups wanted to negotiate over such
things as habitat protection and watershed restoration. The irrigators terminated the
mediation after they concluded (rightly or wrongly) that the other parties were unwilling
to address the irrigators’ concerns.

________________________
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III.
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
KLAMATH ADR ASSESSMENT WORKSHOP
PORTLAND, OREGON
MARCH 24-25, 20034
A) Introduction
On March 24 and 25, 2003, the Natural Resources Law Center of the University of
Colorado Law School (the “NRLC”) and the National Policy Consensus Center of
Portland State University convened a meeting of eighteen individuals who participated in
one or both of two unsuccessful efforts to resolve the water conflicts in the Klamath by
negotiations. The efforts in question were (i) the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process
sponsored by Oregon’s Water Resources Department (the “ADR Process”) and (ii) a
mediation (the “Federal Court Mediation”) conducted in a federal court proceeding
known as Kandra v United States. 5 The goal of the meeting was to develop new insights
into ways for overcoming the many barriers to negotiating solutions to difficult water
resources conflicts by engaging the workshop participants in a dialogue about what went
right, what went wrong and what might have been done differently in their negotiations.
The people who participated in all or portions of the meeting are identified in Part V of
this report.
This report is a summary of the major underlying themes that emerged from the
workshop participants’ comments and is not a record of all comments made. This report
was prepared by the facilitators of the meeting and does not purport to be a consensus
statement about what transpired at the meeting. Consensus was not sought on any points
that were discussed at the meeting, and none of the statements and opinions summarized
below reflect the views of the entire group. This report does not attempt to evaluate,
assess or make judgments about any comments made during the workshop.
B) Origins of the Negotiation Efforts
The origins of the ADR Process are traceable to the Klamath Tribes' proposal that the
Oregon Water Resources Department (the "OWRD") resolve the Tribes’ water rights
claims through negotiations. The OWRD was advised that it could not negotiate directly
with the Klamath Tribes because the Director of the OWRD (the "Director") is, under
Oregon law, the adjudicator of water rights claims in the ongoing Klamath Basin Water
Rights Adjudication. As an alternative to direct negotiations, the Director proposed that a
process be created where all water rights claimants would have an opportunity to come
together to negotiate their claims. The ADR Process commenced in the fall of 1997, and

4
5

This report of the proceedings of the Klamath Workshop was compiled by Lucy Moore and Steve Snyder.
145 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Or. 2001)
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was suspended on September 11, 2001, several months after the curtailment of irrigation
deliveries to the Klamath Project in the spring of 2001.
The Federal Court Mediation was initiated in response to a court order. In April 2001,
several project irrigators commenced a civil proceeding in Oregon Federal District Court
seeking a court order prohibiting the Bureau of Reclamation from withholding deliveries
of irrigation water during the summer of 2001. The Court, before eventually ruling
against the irrigators, referred the dispute to mediation. There were two distinct phases to
the mediation—the first phase (which was initiated at the suggestion of the State of
Oregon) took place prior to a preliminary injunction hearing in late April of 2001 and the
second phase took place following the preliminary injunction hearing. The mediation
terminated, without an agreement, in October 2001.
C) Goals of the Two Negotiation Efforts
1) ADR Process
The OWRD intended that the ADR Process would become a forum for sharing of
information among stakeholders, that it would foster an atmosphere in which parties
could form negotiating groups on their own, and bring back proposals to the ADR group
as a whole that could be incorporated into the Klamath Basin water rights adjudication
decree.
Two different themes emerged when workshop participants were asked to articulate their
reasons for participating in the ADR Process. One theme related to the resolution of
water rights claims in the pending adjudication. For example:
• One participant said she hoped to resolve adjudication issues for her family without
the expense of an attorney.
• Another participant sought to avoid divisive, expensive, lengthy litigation.
• Another hoped the ADR Process would become a comfortable forum for resolving
contested water rights claims.
The second theme related to the use of the ADR Process as a forum for developing and
implementing a plan for improving the management of the basin’s water resources. For
example:
• One participant referred to “looking forward rather than backward”. The
adjudication, it was noted, is based on the past; the ADR looks forward and tries to
create new solutions.
• Another participant referred to the need to include issues and uses downstream in the
lower basin, to reach beyond the state line to include all parties and to create a
solution for the entire watershed.
• Another participant talked about the need to create a shared vision, with more water
for all needs through new projects.
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The former Director of ODWR explained that she conceived of the ADR Process as a
method for transforming the "win-lose" nature of water rights adjudication into a "winwin" negotiation by "making more water". The Director’s goal was to use the ADR
Process as a forum for reaching agreements about a variety of water conservation, water
quality improvement and water supply enhancement measures that would rectify
imbalances in the supply and demand for water. If this objective could be accomplished,
the adjudication of individual water rights claims would have less impact on individual
claimants and water rights disputes should, as a consequence, be easier to resolve by
negotiation.
At one point in the discussion, a workshop participant stated that it was a "subversion" of
the ADR Process to transform a negotiation over water rights into a negotiation about
water management issues.
2) Federal Court Mediation
Workshop participants who were involved in the federal court mediation had different
views about what should be accomplished in the mediation. The first phase focused
exclusively on alternatives for providing some irrigation deliveries in 2001. The second
phase was broader and many issues were brought to the negotiating table by the parties.
In the second phase, project irrigators continued their efforts to negotiate an immediate
resumption of irrigation deliveries and environmental and tribal interests sought to
negotiate fish habitat, demand reduction and watershed restoration measures. The State
of Oregon sought to harmonize the parties’ objectives by combining a drought related
reduction in irrigation deliveries, rather that a full curtailment, along with an increased
commitment to habitat and watershed restoration.
D) Interstate Aspects of the Water Conflict
Several workshop participants observed that many of the water resource problems in the
basin have impacts in both the Upper and the Lower Basins yet no institutional vehicle
exists for making coordinated decisions about how to address those problems. For
example, while the adjudication seeks to determine water rights in Oregon, no
institutional vehicle exists for determining California's share of the Klamath’s water
generated in Oregon. While an interstate compact exists, the compact does not, as do
some other compacts in the west, allocate specific amounts of water between the states.
Except for irrigation deliveries in the Scott and Shasta Rivers and the trans-basin
diversion from the Trinity River to the Sacramento River, there are no significant
consumptive uses from the main stem of the Klamath River in the Lower Basin. As a
consequence, California officials do not feel pressure from "traditional" water users to
resolve the question of California's "fair share" of the water. As another consequence, the
California Tribes have assumed much of the burden of "fighting for" California's share of
the water in the main stem.
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The consensus-based processes in the basin have not dealt with the “interstate aspects”
of the Klamath’s water conflicts.
o The ADR Process is focused on the determination of water rights in Oregon's
portion of the basin.
o The Upper Klamath Working Group does not focus on issues that impact
stakeholders in the Lower Basin.
o The federal court mediation was the first forum in which many of the upper
and lower basin interests were at the table.
E) Differing Perceptions About the Adequacy of the Water Supply
"People are in denial about the adequacy of the water supply," commented one long time
basin resident who had copies of letters written in 1937 that discussed the impact on the
watershed of water shortages.
Workshop participants engaged in an extended discussion about the validity of a draft
scientific report prepared by the Interior Department and the Department of Justice on
behalf of the California Tribes that concludes more water is needed to sustain the Basin’s
the fish population. Some participants believed that the objectivity of the report could
not be questioned, at least by anyone who took the time to study it. Other participants
strongly disagreed and raised concerns about the fact that project irrigators had been
excluded from the process in which the report was discussed. A debate ensued about
whether project irrigators had been excluded or chose not to attend.
Many participants believe that both ADR Process and the Federal Court Mediation may
have suffered from the lack of objective, acceptable science related to fish habitat issues.
Participants debated whether or not it was possible to create a credible research process
that would be acceptable to everyone. Points made during this discussion include:
• It may not be possible to develop a truly objective scientific report. One participant
used the term “sticker shock” and questioned whether some irrigation interests would
accept any report, no matter how objective, that concluded that current water river
flows are inadequate to sustain the fish population.
• One participant stated that increased fish populations is one of his highest goals, but
the narrow focus on allocation of Project water is not helping the debate move
forward.
• One participant noted that the reaction of some groups to the National Resource
Council’s Interim Report (which calls into question the Interior
Department/Department of Justice report) creates the appearance that such groups
are in fact not interested in objective science.
• Why should the conclusion that the water levels in Klamath Lake and Klamath River
are inadequate, a participant asked, inevitably lead to the conclusion that irrigation
interests must suffer.
• The contention, one participant stated, that the supply is inadequate is a stalking horse
for those who have social and political agendas. One example cited was the Klamath
Tribes’ efforts to regain their tribal lands, using water issues as negotiation leverage.
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•

Still another participant observed that scientific issues cannot be addressed in the
abstract and that the specific issues to be investigated are dependent on water
management goals. Building on this point, another participant observed that
decisions about how to achieve management goals require the identification of, and
making decisions about, trade-offs. One way science can help is to provide
information about trade offs.
Several participants suggested that there is a need for a scientific process that all can
buy into.

F) Process Issues
1) The ADR Process:
Because the Director of Oregon's Water Resources Department is also the "Adjudicator"
in the water rights adjudication, the Department was advised that it could not enter into
“one on one” negotiations with the Klamath Tribes over their water rights. This advice
led to the creation of the ADR Process, as a vehicle for negotiating with all parties
involved in the adjudication.
Some felt that the Director's role as convenor and administrator of the ADR process left
the State without an important role at the negotiating table. Perhaps use of a professional
mediator would have enabled the State to take a more proactive role in the negotiations.
The ADR process may have been a grand vision, without enough money to retain a
mediator and other necessary process support.
Some environmental interests did not regard the ADR Process as an acceptable
negotiating forum because (i) the "right people" were not at the table and (ii) the process
focused on Oregon water rights. Some project irrigators objected to using the ADR
Process as a forum for dealing with habit and basin restoration issues. Others saw it as an
appropriate forum for comprehensive solutions. Many workshop participants speculated
that the federal government did not regard or treat the ADR Process as a legitimate
negotiating forum for reasons that were never articulated.
Although the Director periodically consulted California State officials, these officials did
not actively participate in the ADR Process. One reason they did not was the process's
focus on Oregon water issues. The absence of a similar process in California was noted
as an inherent limitation of the Oregon process.
As already noted, at least one ADR participant questioned the legitimacy of redirecting
the focus of negotiations from individual water rights claims to watershed restoration
issues. Other participants believed that the process lacked a shared or common vision,
even though the process included development of written goals and “Operating
Principles”.
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Many workshop participants registered their belief that non-project, "above the lake"
irrigation interests had sought to obstruct and delay the ADR Process, observing that
“above the lake” interests are best served by maintenance of the status quo.
As discussed more fully below, reopening the Adair litigation by the Klamath Tribe and
the federal government in early 2001 was a blow to the ADR process in the eyes of
several participants. It came without warning, and at a time of productive negotiations.
Others believed that the Adair litigation was used as an excuse for not negotiating by
some who never had an intention of negotiating in the first instance.
2) The Federal Court Mediation
Participants in the federal court mediation had widely divergent goals. Project irrigators
sought immediate resumption of water deliveries. They wanted to negotiate over such
things as the legitimacy of the Biological Opinion that led to the termination of water
deliveries. Tribal and environmental interests sought protection for endangered and
threatened species and for ecosystem restoration. They wanted to negotiate over such
things as demand reduction, commercial farming on the wildlife refuges, and habitat
restoration measures. Thus one negotiating group had a short-term focus while another
had a long-term focus.
It was stated by one participant that Project irrigators concluded they had little, if any,
negotiating power. They decided that the best way to advance their interests was to take
action "away from the negotiating table" by, for example, seeking political support from
state and federal elected officials.
Some participants believed that they were making progress when negotiating against a
real negotiating deadline (i.e. the April date for cut off of water deliveries). Once the
deadline passed and the federal court denied the injunction, the negotiating dynamics
changed and any progress made was lost.
The federal government's attitude toward the mediation seemed to change markedly as
the mediation proceeded. At the outset of phase 2 of the mediation, government
representatives seemed to be interested in proactively seeking solutions to negotiating
problems, attempting to balance the needs of the fish and agricultural interests. Later,
some workshop participants suggested, government representatives seemed to lose
interest in the negotiations and made no effort to keep the negotiations "alive". Some
suspected that this "paradigm shift" occurred after agricultural interests put political
pressure on the administration.
Some participants felt that the inability of the irrigation community to obtain relief from
the impacts of the curtailment of water deliveries during the first phase of the mediation
adversely impacted negotiations during the second phase. These participants also
believed that the second phase of the mediation was adversely impacted by the failure of
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many mediation participants to acknowledge the extremis in which the irrigation
community was operating.
Some participants expressed concern about the management of the Federal Court
mediation as more parties joined the mediation. As the parties jockeyed to adjust the
process to meet their differing agendas, the focus of the process became unclear. “The
target and the rules moved at every meeting,” observed one participant. "The feds
changed the agenda on the day of the meeting,” observed another. Another participant
expressed the belief that the mediation sessions themselves were not well controlled and
lacked definition: a broad range of interests, relevant and not, attended the meetings; the
feds sat in the back of the room; the process faced the challenge of dealing with a large
number of very interested people, whose presence complicated the negotiation process,
but whose absence would have caused social and political unrest away from the table.
G) Federal Government's Inability to Negotiate with "One Voice"
Each federal agency has its own agenda and supports and receives support from different
constituencies. Thus, the federal government can "speak with one voice" in a negotiation
only if a high-level political appointee assumes responsibility for spearheading the
negotiations. The federal government’s neglect of the Klamath is evidence that there are
not enough "high level" officials to go around
Late in the ADR Process, a high level official in the Clinton Administration did take
responsibility for spearheading negotiations over the Klamath Tribes' water rights. This
official participated in efforts to advance an “Agreement in Principle” that had been
developed by the Klamath Tribes and project irrigators; however, neither environmental
interests nor the Lower Basin Tribes were initial parties to this negotiation. Earlier in the
ADR Process, the Fish & Wildlife Service’s Christmas Eve letter announcing its intent to
terminate farming on wildlife refuges within the project disrupted negotiations. Later the
overall ADR negotiations were disrupted once again, this time by the actions of the
federal government and the Klamath Tribe in seeking to reopen the long dormant Adair
litigation in the spring of 2001. Any prospect of salvaging the negotiations following the
reopening of Adair vanished when the Bureau of Reclamation announced that no
irrigation deliveries would be made to Klamath Project water users from Upper Klamath
Lake that summer.
The impact on the negotiations of the Fish and Wildlife Service’s conduct, including the
Christmas Eve letter, and of the reopening of Adair were the subject of extended
discussion.
• Some felt the Fish & Wildlife Service acted like a “rogue”, by taking action
without regard to the impact of its action on the negotiation process. Others
speculated that the action may not have occurred had environmental and Lower
Basin interests been involved in the negotiations.
• Reopening Adair felt like a breach of trust to many. Although the Klamath Tribes
and the federal government initiated the action in response to Oregon’s
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“Preliminary Evaluation of Claims,” published by the State in October 1999, it
was difficult for other parties to recover from the shock and comprehend the legal
reasoning that made the action necessary. The “above the lake” irrigation interests
took advantage of the Adair situation to try to bring the negotiations to a halt.
Workshop participants then discussed the federal government’s attitude toward
collaborative negotiations. Many believe that the federal government sends "mixed
messages" about its interest in participating in stakeholder processes. On the one hand,
the federal government claims it wants "locally based" solutions while on the other hand
it seeks to impose solutions based on its view of the politics of the situation. However,
workshop participants also acknowledged that local residents also give conflicting signals
about the federal role. Local residents sometimes want the “feds” to take charge and
solve problems on the one hand, and on the other hand residents resent having the reins
taken away from the local community. There was discussion about the importance of
locals presenting a clear proposal in a unified voice, in order to get the attention and the
unified support of the federal agencies.
Workshop participants debated the appropriate role for the multiple federal agencies in a
collaborative process. The agencies’ functions include regulating, providing funds, and
representing the federal interests (but rarely, if ever, with a single voice). In addition,
some felt that the federal agencies should be accountable for past actions that impacted
irrigators and tribes, and that liability and compensation for past actions must be part of
any negotiation. Project irrigators deemed it particularly unfair that they are now being
asked to bear all of the costs associated with a change in social policies, especially in
light of the fact that their forebears moved to the basin in reliance on previous social
policies. Others deemed it particularly unfair that even earlier promises to tribes were not
being met.
Many felt the federal agencies failed to support the ADR Process in several ways. Their
participation was weak and scattered. The agencies were unable to speak with one voice.
The level of leadership necessary for true support and decision-making was not at the
table, and each administration was painted with actions of subordinates, for better or
worse.
There were questions about whether or not the ADR process was the appropriate forum
for federal participation. The group discussed the possibility of the federal agencies
convening a process (like the Conservation Implementation Program—though some felt
that this process had serious shortcomings), since they usually hold the key to the
solutions. Some felt that this made sense; others warned that the feds bring more
problems than solutions.
H) Multiplicity of Processes
Some workshop participants voiced concern about the multiple consensus-based
processes in the Klamath. In addition to the ADR Process and the Federal Court
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Mediation, there was the Klamath River Task Force, the Upper Klamath Working Group
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission licensing of the Klamath Hydroelectric
Project. How can stakeholders handle multiple processes? How do they know which is
the “real” one, the one worth investing time and energy in? In the Klamath, parties are
exhausted, personally and institutionally, from “chasing from one event to another,”
afraid to miss out on what may turn out to be the real game. Participants question
whether or not there is continuity from one process to another.
I) Thoughts About a New Process
Some workshop participants wanted to discuss what a new process should look like,
assuming people have the energy to make still another attempt at resolving the Klamath’s
water problems collaboratively. Although many participants registered their ambivalence
about the idea of still another process, the group agreed to discuss the issue.
Participants made a number of suggestions about what would constitute a legitimate
process and what would be necessary to enhance the prospects of success. The following
suggestions were made but no consensus was reached or even attempted.
Any new process:
• Should be congressionally mandated and funded.
• Should have a grass roots component.
• Should include only individuals who are collaboratively inclined and willing to make
a commitment to the process.
• Should include those at a level to make decisions.
• Should include the two states as equal partners.
• Should provide a small plane to accommodate the long distance travel needs of
participants.
• Should have a small steering committee.
• Should establish a scientific and technical data gathering system.
• Should have strong leadership.
• Should have professional mediation.
Achieving immediate, “on the ground” results is a necessary component of any new
process, one participant argued. A discussion then followed about the advantages of
small-scale accomplishments versus efforts to reach global solutions. “We know what
needs to be done, on the ground. Let’s start doing ‘stuff’,” commented a participant. This
would involve allowing others to try things, as well as undertaking projects yourself.
A participant observed that “Many parties are not yet able to grasp that they will not get
everything they want.” Furthermore, some do not want to support anything that will
benefit their opponent, on general principles. Until everyone can accept the need to give
up something, some said, collaboration will be impossible. “If major players hang onto
the competitive approach, they will not be able to collaborate.”
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Potential Models: The Conservation Implementation Plan is considered by some to be a
model for a Klamath Basin process, though others expressed concerns over using this
process as a model. The group is small – 7-9 people – and was called for in the Biological
Opinion. Another model could be the TMDL Teams, which are administered at the state
level.
FERC Re-licensing Process: Participants noted that this is an on-going process that might
serve as a vehicle for addressing water management problems collaboratively.
J) Leadership
In response to a question about who showed leadership in the basin, no examples were
cited other than Senator Hatfield's efforts in forming the "Upper Basin Working Group."
A leader is someone who has the greater public good as a priority, offered one
participant. Political leaders are reluctant to lead when faced with a local controversy,
several group members observed, because politicians know they will become targets if
things turn out badly. Someone asked if "ordinary" people in the Klamath showed acts of
vision and courage. No one responded to this comment.
K) Foundation for Cooperation
While the facilitators purposefully did not engage workshop participants in a dialogue
about the substantive issues, the intractable nature of those issues was apparent
throughout the dialogue. Two examples illustrate:
• Throughout the workshop, project irrigators observed they “had done nothing
wrong". The federal government had offered incentives to those who were
willing to homestead and farm the lands served by the Project. Descendants of
theses homesteaders should not have to bear the cost of a change in social policy.
• Other participants challenged the tacit assumption that “the fish” and tribal
interests are entitled only to what’s left after farming interests are satisfied. One
participant "took offense" when a facilitator posed the question "why, despite four
years of effort in the ADR Process, were the parties unable to avoid the 2001
irrigation crisis?" To even ask such a question, the participant observed,
suggested that farming interests were more important than other interests and
failed to acknowledge the already existing environmental crisis and harmful
impacts on commercial fishing and tribal communities.
At the conclusion of the workshop, the facilitators remarked on the participants'
demeanor. The facilitators observed that workshop participants were respectful and
courteous to one another. All workshop participants demonstrated their awareness of and
acknowledged the different points of view of other participants. Why, the facilitators
asked, were negotiations so difficult, given what appears to be productive working
relationships among all workshop participants? In response, one participant observed
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that, in spite of mutual respect and even affection, “we do not trust one another". No
participant took issue with this comment.
One participant summarized the dilemma they all confront. "It's difficult to cooperate
when the consequences of being taken advantage of are so severe".

________________________
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IV.
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
WATER NEGOTIATORS WORKSHOP
BOULDER, COLORADO
JUNE 4 AND 5, 20036
A) Introduction
On June 4 and 5, 2003, the Natural Resources Law Center of the University of Colorado
Law School (the “NRLC”) convened a workshop of eighteen people (plus one observer)
who had taken part in difficult and contentious negotiations over water allocation issues.
Nine of the workshop participants had taken part as negotiators; nine had taken part as
mediators. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and elaborate on the lessons
learned by workshop participants from their negotiations. The participants in the
workshop are identified in Part V of this report. .
This report is a summary of the major underlying themes that emerged from the
workshop participants’ comments. It does not attempt to recreate the language the
participants used when making their comments nor is it a record of all comments made.
Consensus was not sought on any points, and none of the statements and opinions
summarized below reflect the views of the entire group. This report does not attempt to
evaluate, assess or make judgments about any comments made during the workshop. All
workshop participants had the opportunity to comment upon this report, and this report
incorporates all comments made.
B) Identification of Negotiation Challenges
At the outset of the workshop, each participant was asked to identify a major challenge he
or she had confronted in a water allocation negotiation. Some of the challenges identified
were:
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•

The need to find new water. Water allocation negotiations are inherently
“win-lose” negotiations, except to the extent that more water can be “created”
through construction of new storage facilities, implementation of water
conservation measures and other actions. “Creating” new water in the arid
and rapidly growing Western United States is becoming increasingly difficult.

•

Responding to the different approaches States take when negotiating with
Native American Tribes over tribal water rights claims. For example,
Montana negotiates with Tribes on a “government to government” basis.
Stakeholder groups (such as irrigators and environmentalists) do not
participate directly in the negotiations. By way of contrast, in California the
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Tribes negotiate directly with other stakeholder groups and their sovereign
status is not recognized.
•

The variety and complexity of the legal issues that arise in a single
negotiation. For example, a water rights negotiation might not be limited to
issues arising under state water law. It might also include matters arising
under the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, federal reclamation
law, federal hydropower regulatory requirements and land use law.

•

Finding the right mix of negotiating issues and parties. There are so many
potential negotiating issues and parties to a water negotiation that productive
negotiations are not possible, unless limits are imposed on the number of
issues and parties.

•

How to begin the negotiations. For example, should the negotiators initially
focus on the “big picture” issues and run the risk of polarizing the parties?
Alternatively, should the negotiators focus initially on less contentious
problems and run the risk that the parties will remain in denial about the
difficulties of the problems they confront?

•

Getting negotiations started where there is a long history of animosity and
litigation among key parties. For example, in the Flathead in Montana,
relationships are strained after years of litigation between the Tribe and the
irrigation community.

•

The inability to assess the extent to which federal funding will be available to
finance the implementation of negotiated solutions to water allocation
problems. Water negotiations inevitably result in proposals that require the
expenditure of significant amounts of federal money. Realistically assessing
how much money might be available is next to impossible.

•

Integrating scientific, technical and cultural issues into the negotiation. Water
negotiations inevitably raise scientific and technical questions (such as the
amount of water necessary to protect endangered fish) and cultural concerns
(such as preservation of fishing for ceremonial purposes). The failure to
address these issues in sensitive ways can polarize the negotiations.

•

Negotiating short-term agreements that address an immediate water shortage.
Unless the impacts of a pressing problem (such as the existing drought) are
mitigated, people will be unwilling to talk about long run solutions to water
allocation problems.

•

Obtaining political support for an ongoing negotiation. Water allocation
issues are politically charged, and negotiating in a highly charged political
environment will be difficult unless politicians support the negotiation
process.
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•

Dealing with unbounded stakeholder groups. In a water negotiation, there are
large numbers of stakeholders with a variety of conflicting interests. It is
difficult to organize a manageable negotiating group that reflects the diversity
of parties and issues.

C) Convening and Managing an Effective Forum for Negotiations
The first topic the workshop participants addressed dealt with their experiences in
convening and managing the negotiation process. The facilitators opened the discussion
by relating two vignettes taken from a recent workshop involving stakeholders who had
been involved in two unsuccessful efforts to resolve the water conflicts in the Klamath
Basin.
The first vignette related to the efforts of the Oregon Water Resources Department (the
“OWRD”) to convene an ADR Process to resolve the water rights claims in the Klamath
Basis water rights adjudication. The OWRD acted as the convenor and manager of the
Klamath Basin ADR Process even though, as the state’s water management agency, it
was also responsible for both adjudicating all disputed water rights claims and for
developing the state’s water management policies. Some stakeholders questioned
whether the state could act as an unbiased convenor of the ADR Process while also
serving as the arbiter of all unresolved water rights disputes. Others questioned whether
the OWRD failed to exert leadership by proactively advancing water management
proposals. The OWRD seemed to take a passive role in the negotiations out of concern
that by being proactive it might compromise its role as convenor and facilitator of
negotiations.
The second vignette related to the lack of funds for necessary process support. Because
of the lack of funding, OWRD was unable to retain a mediator or conduct a situation
assessment. Limited funds were available to pay for joint fact finding processes, such as
a neutral scientific investigation of the amount of water necessary to protect endangered
species.
A workshop participant familiar with the Klamath situation responded to these vignettes
by stating that important stakeholders did not trust the OWRD. For example, the
Klamath Tribes, after having defended their water rights claims from attack by the
OWRD for decades, could not bring themselves to think of the OWRD as a neutral
facilitator of the negotiation process. Another workshop participant familiar with the
Klamath suggested that many process problems might have been avoided had the OWRD
retained an independent consultant to conduct a situation assessment before proceeding
with the ADR Process. An assessment, the participant explained, is a critical intervention
since it forces the parties to think realistically about what might (or might not) be
accomplished in a negotiation and about what obstacles must be addressed if a
negotiation is to proceed in a positive manner.
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Another workshop participant confirmed the value of a situation assessment. Each
negotiation has its unique set of problems and a situation assessment is a vehicle for
anticipating and responding to those problems. Another participant offered a further
reason for doing an assessment. A situation assessment bolsters efforts to obtain
governmental and foundation funding for mediation services and other process support.
Inherent in every assessment, a workshop participant observed, is the question of whether
to convene a consensus based process in which all stakeholders (or their representatives)
participate or whether to convene a more traditional negotiation in which only key
stakeholders participate. The number of negotiators in a water rights negotiation, this
participant observed, could quickly become unmanageable if all persons who might be
impacted by a negotiation were asked to participate. For that reason, it is normally
preferable to keep the negotiating group small at the outset and add members to the group
as the situation warrants.
Another workshop participant seconded this view. Why, the participant asked, would
people who are not parties to the underlying water rights litigation ever be invited to
participate in a water rights negotiation? One might ask non-parties to participate,
someone responded, if non-parties had the power (for example, by political action or
litigation) to frustrate any settlement reached. Still another workshop participant
proposed a formula for determining whether persons who are not parties to the litigation
should be asked to participate in a negotiation: whether non-parties should participate
depends on the problems underlying the litigation. If the underlying problem can be
resolved by a court decision, only the parties to the litigation need be parties to the
negotiation. On the other hand, if the problem will remain regardless of the outcome of
the litigation, a consensus-based process where all affected stakeholders are invited to
participate might be preferable. Ways can be found, this participant asserted, for dealing
with the large numbers of stakeholders that might potentially be involved in such a
negotiation.
A workshop participant then observed that lawyer and non-lawyer mediators tend to take
different approaches to negotiations. Lawyer-mediators are more likely to start with a
small negotiating group and expand the group as the situation warrants. Non-lawyer
mediators tend to invite all stakeholder groups to participate and assume (rightly or
wrongly) that they will be able to find ways to manage a potentially unwieldy group.
While an “all inclusive” model is a “feel good” model, a participant observed, there is no
one correct answer to the question of who should participate in a negotiation.
Particularly in water negotiations where the number of impacted parties is so large,
creating a process for managing the negotiations can be an insuperable task.
Often a mediator is brought into an ongoing negotiation, a participant observed. In those
situations, the mediator must adapt to a negotiating group that has already been formed.
She must understand the strengths and limitations of the “consensus based” and “key
players” models of negotiating and be prepared to deal with the problems inherent in the
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model she finds herself dealing with. Another participant concurred, but observed that
there are practical limits to what can be done in each type of negotiating group.
A workshop participant responded to this discussion by articulating a concern of Native
American Tribes about negotiations in general and consensus based processes in
particular. Many tribes are concerned that their voices will be diluted if they participate
in a process where they are but one of many negotiators. Tribes are sovereign
governments, so they are likely to prefer a “government to government” negotiating
model, such as the one employed in Montana.
As the discussion concluded, a participant reminded the group of the value of “informal”
or “off-line” negotiations. Whether the negotiating group is small or large, frequently the
most progress is made when subsets of negotiators meet privately, outside of the formal
negotiation process.
D) Scientific and Technical Issues
The second topic addressed by workshop participants dealt with the impact of scientific
and technical disputes on the negotiation process. Once again, the workshop facilitators
began the discussion by relating two vignettes taken from the Klamath stakeholders’
workshop.
The first vignette related to the Bush administration’s effort to resolve the debate over
how much water was needed to protect the endangered and threatened fish inhabiting
Klamath Lake and Klamath River. At the administration’s request, the National
Academy of Sciences appointed an independent panel of experts to look into this
question. The panel issued an interim report that concluded there was “no scientific
basis” for the Bureau of Reclamation’s decision to maintain water levels in Klamath Lake
and Klamath River by terminating irrigation deliveries in the summer of 2001. Irrigation
interests seized on the report as proof that federal regulatory officials had been practicing
“junk science” when they ordered that irrigation deliveries be terminated. It was apparent
from the Klamath Workshop that the NAS report has done nothing to quell the debate
over the amount of water necessary to protect the fish. In fact, at the Klamath Workshop,
stakeholders continued to engage in the debate, relying on or attacking the findings of the
NAS panel, depending on whether the findings supported or undermined their positions.
The second vignette related to “sticker shock”. A participant in the Klamath Workshop
used this term to describe her belief about how irrigation interests would react to a “truly
objective” scientific analysis of the Klamath. Whatever the amount of water necessary to
protect the fish, the amount would be so large as to constitute “sticker shock” to irrigation
interests and would be rejected out of hand by them because of the adverse implications
for farming in the basin.
A workshop participant responded to these two vignettes by observing that the Bush
administration did not ask the NAS panel the correct question. From the perspective of
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the Klamath Tribe, the question was not simply what water level was necessary to
maintain the fish population. The Tribe’s concern for the fish population emanated from
cultural and religious values. Decisions about actions necessary to protect the fish
population could only be made by consideration of those values. Another workshop
participant observed that policy differences, not scientific disputes, are what are at stake
in a water allocation negotiation, and no scientific panel can make credible judgments
about policy issues. In a negotiation, all stakeholders must be involved both in
formulating the questions asked and directing the investigation of independent experts.
Several workshop participants elaborated on the concept of a joint scientific investigation
conducted under the direction of all stakeholders. One of the major problems inherent in
the biological opinion process mandated by the Endangered Species Act is the lack of
stakeholder involvement in the development of biological opinions. As a consequence,
the Fish & Wildlife Service winds up producing a document it feels forced to defend. A
more productive way of proceeding would be for the effected parties to engage in a
collaborative search for ways of addressing problems for which there are no known
solutions. What the ESA requires, a participant observed, is not the “correct answer” but
an answer based on the “best available science”. Debates over what scientific answer is
“correct” are unresolveable in part because no “correct” answer is possible given the
present state of knowledge and in part because the “correct” answer is a policy question
based on different people’s tolerances for risk and uncertainty.
Answering the scientific question is not always necessary or helpful, a participant
observed. What is required is that the underlying problem be addressed and that steps for
addressing the problem be developed in light of the uncertainty and risks inherent in the
particular situation.
Where it is necessary that an uncertain scientific question be “resolved”, (for example, in
the context of an ongoing lawsuit) a preferable way for doing so is through the use of a
neutral panel of scientific experts. However, the procedure the panel follows should not
be the traditional procedure where the parties present evidence and argument and the
panel makes a decision. Rather, the panel should engage in an interactive dialogue with
the parties and their experts before making a decision. By engaging in an interactive
dialogue, the panel will be forced to come to grips with the more subtle aspects of the
situation.
The scientific process in the Klamath was flawed, a participant observed, because the
Bush administration was not looking for a solution to the water management issues in the
Klamath. Rather the administration was looking for a solution to a political problem. It
was looking for a way to appease the irrigation community and assumed there was a
scientific answer to a question surrounded by uncertainty. Appointing an expert,
purportedly objective panel was good politics. It was not a useful way for addressing the
Klamath’s watershed problems.
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Joint fact finding, a participant observed, is the preferable (and perhaps the only) way for
making progress when scientific and technical debates are at the root of water allocation
disputes.
E) The Impact on Negotiations of Strategic Moves and Collateral Events
As their third topic, workshop participants discussed the impact on negotiations of the
parties’ strategic moves and the occurrence of collateral events. Following their
established practice, the facilitators began the discussion by relating two vignettes from
the Klamath Workshop.
The first event vignette related to the irrigators’ decision to terminate the federal court
mediation that was attempted after the irrigators commenced litigation seeking a
preliminary injunction mandating that irrigation deliveries be resumed. The irrigators
withdrew from the mediation shortly after the court denied their request for a preliminary
injunction. They did so, in part, because they concluded that mediation offered no hope
for resolving their immediate problem—the lack of irrigation water—and that
environmental and tribal groups were not prepared to address ways for mitigating the
harm caused by the termination of irrigation deliveries. In deciding to terminate the
mediation, the irrigators concluded that they could best accomplish their goals through
other actions, such as initiating “takings” litigation against the federal government and
mounting a political campaign. Perhaps, a workshop facilitator suggested, environmental
and tribal interests overplayed their hand in refusing to address the irrigators concerns in
the mediation.
The second vignette related to the reopening of the so-called Adair litigation. At the
same time that an effort was being made to reinvigorate negotiations in the ADR process,
the Klamath Tribes instituted new litigation in the same federal court that had confirmed
the priority of its water rights. Many community members (rightly or wrongly) regarded
the Tribe’s actions as a breach of trust. The resulting widespread hostility toward the
Tribe undermined the efforts to reinvigorate negotiations. What was evident from the
Klamath Workshop was the intense emotions generated by the Tribe’s actions in
reopening Adair. At that workshop, one stakeholder said she felt “betrayed and hurt” by
the Tribe’s action at the time and that she feels the same way today, even though she now
accepts the Tribe’s explanation for why it did what it did.
Workshop participants reacted to the facilitators’ description of these events in a variety
of ways. Two workshop participants defended the Tribe’s action, observing that the
Tribe reopened Adair to challenge (successfully, as it turned out) an extremely prejudicial
decision in the Klamath water rights adjudication. In response to these comments, a
workshop participant stated that the issue was not whether the Tribe’s action in reopening
Adair was justified. The issue was whether the Tribe could have accomplished its
objective without disrupting the negotiations. One way of doing so might have been to
inform the other parties in advance of its plans, its reasons for reopening Adair and of its
desire to negotiate despite the reopening. Still another participant observed that the
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impact of reopening Adair might have been different had the parties retained a mediator.
A mediator might have helped the parties reach agreement on how the Tribe might
reopen Adair without disrupting negotiations. Alternatively a mediator might have taken
proactive steps to limit the impact of the reopening on the negotiation process.
A resilient negotiating process, a workshop participant observed, can absorb the impact
of actions such as the reopening of Adair. The challenge is to create a resilient process.
Contracting (i.e. the establishment of negotiating ground rules), another participant
observed, is an essential ingredient to the creation of a resilient process. Through the
contracting process, process rules can be agreed upon (such as the establishment of a “no
surprise policy”) that will mitigate the impact of the parties’ gamesmanship. Another
participant cited the example of a process rule that had served a difficult negotiation quite
well. Each negotiation session began with a discussion of recent developments and the
parties’ reactions to those developments.
Ground rules, a participant observed, will never prevent a party from taking action
outside the negotiation process if the party believes it has nothing to gain from a
negotiation. It is the mediator’s job to ensure that the mediation does not reach such a
stage. One way a mediator can do so is by helping the parties understand that strategic
moves are not meant as “personal affronts”; they are part and parcel of the negotiating
process. Building resiliency in a water rights negotiation, a participant then observed, is
a challenging task. Because negotiations go on for years, the negotiators and the
principles for the key players change, and these changes often herald changes in
negotiation positions.
Not just actions but also language can generate visceral reactions that undermine
negotiations, a participant next observed. For example, tribal members may react
negatively to negotiators who speak in terms of the “creation” of an Indian water right as
opposed to the “recognition” of an already existing water right. Mediators, not just
negotiators, are guilty of using inflammatory language.
A workshop participant then raised the topic of mediator neutrality. A mediator is never
“neutral” in the sense of having no personal preferences and biases. What a mediator
should strive to be is “multi-partial”. A successful mediator is a mediator who
conceptualizes his or her role as an advocate for all parties.
Leadership is another component of a resilient negotiating process, a workshop
participant later observed. Politicians can exercise leadership in a variety of ways. They
might act as the convenor of a collaborative process or lend their support to an ongoing
process. They might champion negotiations when their constituents advocate litigation or
political action. They might sponsor legislation that implements negotiated solutions to
water allocation problems. Negotiators must also exercise leadership if resilience is to
become part of the negotiation process. Two examples of leadership by one of the parties
to a negotiation were cited. In the Rocky Boy water rights negotiation, the Tribe
exhibited leadership by making negotiating proposals that responded to the other parties
concerns. In the Klamath, the attorney for the Klamath Tribe attempted to mitigate the
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impact of the reopening of Adair by offering creative negotiating proposals immediately
after the reopening.
A workshop participant questioned whether political leadership would ever be
forthcoming in a high stakes water conflict. The risk of adverse political consequences is
too great. Another participant disagreed. He cited the Cal-Fed process as an example of
a negotiation that succeeded, in part because a politician had exhibited political courage.
Mediation, at least as it is presently practiced, is not well equipped to solve problems
such as the Klamath, a workshop participant suggested. Mediation works well, even in
highly emotional situations such as divorce, where there are no major institutional
impediments to negotiations. But in situations such as the Klamath, institutional
impediments abound. To name but two examples, scientific uncertainty and the
conflicting agendas of government agencies present major institutional barriers to the
achievement of negotiated solutions to water resource problems. Process design is a
major issue that requires much new thinking.
Politics, a participant observed, is an ever-present ingredient of a water rights negotiation
and the impact of politics might be positive or negative. For example, concern about a
possible change in policy when a new administration takes power might serve as an
inducement for the parties to quickly conclude negotiations. Alternatively, it might
inhibit negotiations if one of the parties concludes that the new administration will be
favorably disposed to its interests.
F) Jurisdictional Fragmentation and the Inability of the Federal Government to
Negotiate with One Voice
As their next topic, workshop participants discussed the impact on negotiations of
jurisdictional fragmentation and the consequent inability of the federal government to
“negotiate with one voice”. Once again, the facilitators began the discussion with two
vignettes from the Klamath Workshop. In one vignette, at a critical stage in negotiations,
the Fish & Wildlife Service, without consulting with the head of the federal government’s
negotiating team, announced its intent to terminate a long standing federal policy of
permitting farming operations in wildlife refuges within the Klamath reclamation project.
The actions of this rogue agency infuriated one of the principal stakeholder groups,
namely the irrigation community, at a critical stage in the negotiations.
The second vignette related to “process fatigue.” At the Klamath Workshop, it became
apparent that Klamath stakeholders have, over the years, been asked to participate in
multiple collaborative events. Each of these events represents an attempted to address
piecemeal a particular manifestation of an overarching problem. Over the years,
stakeholders have lost their optimism about the likelihood that something might be
accomplished at one of these events. While they still participate, many do so out of fear
that something detrimental to their interests will happen if they fail to participate.
Despite their process fatigue, stakeholders at the Klamath Workshop expressed their
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willingness to participate in still another process if they had some reason to believe that it
might actually produce tangible results.
A workshop participant responded to the facilitators’ vignettes by describing the political
dynamics that make it next to impossible for the federal government to “speak with one
voice” in a negotiation. To begin with, jurisdictional fragmentation means that no single
agency has overarching responsibility for all federal water allocation issues within a
single agency. Depending on the specific situation, several agencies within the
Department of Interior, such as the Bureau of Reclamation, the Fish & Wildlife Service
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, will have different and frequently conflicting missions.
Moreover, federal agencies not part of the Department of Interior, such as the Forest
Service, the Federal Power Commission and the Corps of Engineers, often have
regulatory responsibilities within a river basin.
Even within the Department of Interior, developing a single negotiation position is
difficult. As stated, the regulatory mandates of the agencies within the Department often
conflict. Each agency is headed by a political appointee who may or may not have
substantive expertise and whose ideological views may differ from those in the so-called
“permanent bureaucracy”. Although a senior official (i.e. an Assistant Secretary)
supervises each sub-cabinet agency’s activities, rarely does the same sub-cabinet official
supervise the daily operations of agencies with conflicting agendas. For all of these
reasons, coordination of agency action and the development of a common negotiating
position are next to impossible. As a consequence, negotiating progress is possible only
when a senior administration official, either directly or through a respected deputy with
an unambiguous mandate, proactively works with the various agencies to develop a
unified federal negotiating position.
States have, another workshop participant observed, similar problems for similar reasons
in speaking with one voice in a negotiation. Another participant observed that
developing a coordinated federal-state approach to water allocation problems is an
essential ingredient of a successful negotiation. Unfortunately, coordination is extremely
difficult given the political and organizational dynamics at work within both state and
federal governments. However, examples of successful coordinated action exist. Two
prominent examples are Cal-Fed and the Florida Everglade restoration effort. Both of
these examples involve innovative institutional arrangements and their success suggests
that such arrangements may be a necessary component of a successful approach to
intractable water management issues.
At the Klamath Workshop, a facilitator observed, Klamath residents reported an
ambivalent attitude toward federal government initiatives. On the one hand, local
residents want to develop their own solutions to what they deem to be local problems.
On the other hand, these same local residents urge the federal government to exercise
leadership by proactively engaging in the problem solving process. Local residents also
look to the federal government for the financing necessary to implement water
management and watershed restoration initiatives. A similar ambivalent attitude towards
the federal government likely exists in water basins throughout the West.
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The pervasive federal role in watershed matters makes it imperative, a workshop
participant observed, that the federal government exercise leadership. No other
organization is positioned to do so. The Klamath is an example of what might happen
when federal leadership is absent. Because of the pervasive federal role, many local
Klamath residents tended to sit back and wait for the federal government to propose a
“magic bullet” type solution to the basin’s water problems. Unfortunately, the various
federal agencies continued to pursue their separate and conflicting agendas.
G) Other Topics of Concern
To conclude the workshop, the participants selected for discussion two topics of
particular interest to them: (i) negotiating deadlines and (ii) special concerns when
negotiating with Tribes.
1) Negotiating Deadlines. The discussion began with the articulation of a proposition
that no workshop participant disputed: Realistic yet meaningful deadlines are a critical
component of a successful negotiation. Participants then proceeded to discuss how
realistic and meaningful deadlines might be imposed.
Court imposed deadlines, a participant noted, are invariably taken seriously but when a
negotiation does not take place in the context of a court proceeding, setting meaningful
deadlines is challenging. Agencies and foundations that provide funding for mediation
services, a workshop participant suggested, can create meaningful deadlines by imposing
limits on the period of time for which they are willing to provide funding. Another
participant suggested that a mediator might impose a deadline by stating her intent to
withdraw if satisfactory progress is not made within a specified time frame. A crisis, a
participant noted, might be tantamount to a deadline if the crisis energizes the parties to
seek solutions to the problems causing the crisis. However, crises do not invariably spur
negotiations. For example, the hostile emotional climate triggered by the termination of
irrigation deliveries in the Klamath may have contributed to the irrigator’s decision to
withdraw from the federal court mediation.
Deadlines imposed by the parties themselves are possible, a participant noted, but the risk
exists that the parties will not take such deadlines seriously. Nevertheless, a formal
commitment by the parties to periodically review the progress of negotiations may keep
the negotiations on track.
Whenever a party concludes that sufficient negotiating progress is not being made, that
party should not hesitate to articulate its concerns, a participant stated, nor should the
party hesitate to withdraw from negotiations and commence litigation if action is not
taken to remedy the situation. The time may not be ripe for negotiations until legal
uncertainty is clarified by a court decision or factual information is developed through the
discovery process.
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2) Special Concerns When Negotiating with Tribes. Tribes, a workshop participant
observed, are not simply another stakeholder group. They are sovereign governments
and expect to be treated as such. The participant cited an example of a negotiation in
which a tribe refused to participate because its sovereignty was not acknowledged and it
was treated as just one of many stakeholders.
Tribes are comfortable with Montana’s process for negotiating tribal water rights, a
participant observed, because the tribes negotiate on a “government to government” basis
with the State and the federal government. Stakeholder groups participate in the
negotiations indirectly through a variety of public participation processes convened by
the State.
One workshop participant raised what he acknowledged was a sensitive issue. He
wondered why, in negotiations in which he was now involved, the tribal negotiator acted
“unprofessionally”. For example, the tribal member did not attend regularly scheduled
meetings or, when he did, did not participate in the meetings in meaningful ways.
Workshop participants had a variety of reactions to this question. Tribes, one participant
observed, are not monolithic organizations, so there is no single answer to the question of
how to engage a tribe in the negotiation process. The behavior the questioner described
may be a negotiating tactic, or perhaps tribal members need training in how to negotiate.
Alternatively, the tribe may not be fully engaged in the negotiation because of discomfort
with the structure of the negotiation process. Each tribe is different. They have different
traditions and customs. Behavior that one tribe deems appropriate might not be condoned
by another tribe. In each negotiation, the process concerns of the particular tribe must be
identified and addressed if progress is to be made. The best way to do so is to solicit, in
advance, the tribe’s views about how the negotiation should be structured.

________________________
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V.
List of Workshop Participants:
Klamath Workshop
The persons who participate in all, or a portion of, the Klamath ADR Assessment
Workshop, in Portland Oregon, on March 24-25, 2003 are:
Bob Anderson
Professor, University of Washington Law
School and Former Special Assistant to
Interior Secretary Babbitt

Paul Cleary
Director, Oregon Water Resources
Department

Troy Fletcher
Executive Director, Yurok Tribe

Rodger Hamilton
Former Special Assistant to Oregon
Governor Kitzhaber

Becky Hatfield-Hyde
Williamson River, Rancher

Bob Hunter
Attorney, WaterWatch

Steve Kandra
Klamath Irrigation District

Alice Kilham
Member, Klamath River Compact
Commission

Don Koch
Regional Manager, California Department
of Game and Fish

Reed Marbut
Water Rights Specialist, Oregon Water
Resources Department

Jeff Mitchell
Member, Klamath Tribe

Todd Olson
PacifiCorp

Martha Pagel
Attorney and Former Director, Oregon
Water Resources Department

Dwight Russell
Chief Northern District, California
Department of Water Resources and
Member Klamath River Compact
Commission

Marshall Staunton
Member, Upper Klamath Working Group

Cindy Staunton
Resident, Tule Lake

Paul Simmons
Attorney for Klamath Project Water Users

Bud Ullman
Attorney, Klamath Tribe
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Lucy Moore
Workshop Facilitator

Steve Snyder
Workshop Facilitator

Greg Wolf
Director, National Policy Consensus Center
Negotiators Workshop
The persons who participated in all, or a portion of, the Water Negotiators Workshop, in
Boulder Colorado on June 4 and 5, 2003 are:
Juliana E. Birkhoff
Mediator, RESOLVE

David Ceppos
Mediator, Center for Collaborative Policy
Sacramento, CA

Barbara Cosens
Mediator and Professor, Environmental
Studies
San Francisco State University

Susan Cottingham
Program Director
Montana Reserved Water Rights
Commission
Helena MT

John B. Draper
Attorney, Montgomery & Andrews, P.A.
Santa Fe, NM

Yvonne Knight
Staff Attorney
Native American Rights Fund
Boulder, CO

Estevan R. Lopez
Director
New Mexico Interstate Stream
Commission
Santa Fe, NM

Rita Maguire
Arizona Center for Public Policy
Phoenix, AZ

Francis McGovern
Mediator and Professor
Duke University Law School
Durham, NC

Chris Moore
Mediator
CDR Associates
Boulder, CO

Shaun McGrath
Program Manager
Western Governors’ Association
Denver, CO

Kathryn Mutz
Research Associate
Natural Resources Law Center
University of Colorado Law School
Boulder, CO
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Hon. Michael C. Nelson
Mediator and Superior Court Judge
Phoenix AZ

Scott Peppet
Mediator and Professor
University of Colorado Law School
Boulder, CO

Stanly Pollock
Attorney
Navajo Nation
Window Rock, AZ

Les Ramirez
Attorney
Albuquerque, NM

Zell Stevers
Dispute Resolution Specialist
US Bureau of Reclamation
Washington, DC

Lucy Moore
Workshop Facilitator
Santa Fe, NM

Steve Snyder
Workshop Facilitator
Corrales, NM
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